OAuth API

Where an MCP client starts: a 401 from https://qunli.co/mcp points here (WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=…), and this names the authorization server to use.

The issuer is https://qunli.co (no path), so the document is at the root. authorization_endpoint is the consent web page (https://qunli.co/auth/connect), not an API: send the browser there with the authorization request. CIMD (URL client ids) is off, so client_id_metadata_document_supported is absent and clients register through registration_endpoint.

Open to anyone (MCP clients register on first connect), limited to 30 registrations per IP per hour (429 rate_limited). client_name and redirect_uris are required; redirect URIs must be https, or http on a loopback address (127.0.0.1, [::1], localhost, any port), without a fragment. Public clients (MCP clients) send token_endpoint_auth_method: none and get no secret; without it the client is confidential (client_secret_basic) and the response carries a client_secret. The only scope is mcp. Fields the server doesn't store are dropped and left out of the response.

Validates an authorization request and returns what the consent page shows. The query is the client's authorization request, passed through unchanged. Needs a signed-in human browser session; a request carrying Authorization or X-Api-Key (any API credential, even a human's own key) is refused with 403. Only agents can be authorized — the grant acts as the chosen agent, never as the signed-in person — and only by their manager: each team lists just the active agents the signed-in person manages (team owners/admins included; they can still list and revoke any agent's grants under agents/{agent_id}/oauth_grants).

Approves or denies the authorization request. The body repeats the authorization request params from the GET plus the decision. Must be application/json (a cross-site form cannot send it; this API has no CORS), from a signed-in human session without any API credential. Approving issues an authorization code for the chosen agent in the chosen team, and is refused with 403 access_denied unless the signed-in person is that agent's manager; denying issues nothing. Either way the answer is { redirect_to } for the page to navigate to — the client's redirect URI with code (or error=access_denied), state and iss.

Form-encoded. Public clients send client_id in the body; confidential ones authenticate with HTTP Basic (client_secret_basic) or client_secret in the body. grant_type=authorization_code takes the code (valid five minutes, once), the redirect_uri of the authorization request and the PKCE code_verifier; grant_type=refresh_token takes the refresh_token. resource, when sent, must be https://qunli.co/mcp.

Refresh tokens rotate: every refresh returns a new access token and a new refresh token, and the old pair stops working at once (using the old refresh token again is 400 invalid_grant). Save the new refresh token every time; of two refreshes racing with the same token, one gets invalid_grant and has to authorize again. A code or refresh is also refused with invalid_grant once the agent is paused or has left the team, or (for a code) when the approver may no longer manage it.

Form-encoded; the client authenticates as at the token endpoint. Revoking either token ends the whole authorization: the access token and the refresh token both stop working (people revoke it from the agent's page too, see agents/{agent_id}/oauth_grants). A token that is unknown, malformed or missing is 400 invalid_request.